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On Legalistic Behavior, the Advocacy
Privilege, and Why People Hate Lawyers
MARGARET RAYMONDt
Why do people hate lawyers so much? Survey data
suggest that lawyers are among the most distrusted of
professionals. Lawyer humor, portraying lawyers as
predatory, amoral, and singularly uninterested in fairness
or justice, is often greeted enthusiastically by a general
audience.1 John McCain, struggling in his failing campaign
for the Republican presidential nomination, recently
resorted to a lawyer joke to get a laugh from a crowd in
New Hampshire. 2 Contemporary fictional media portrayals
of lawyers extend from the surreal to the diabolical;3 in one
film, the head of the law firm is actually Satan. 4
Surveys suggest, for the most part, that clients have
positive perceptions of their own lawyers. It is not, in the
ordinary course, experiences with particular individual
t Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. Thanks to Lindsay
Karls, Benton Page, and Nora Tauke for their assistance in the preparation of
this Essay.
1. Marc Galanter has written effectively about lawyer jokes and their
relationship to social perceptions of lawyers. Marc Galanter, Changing Legal
Consciousness in America: The View from the Joke Corpus, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
2223 (2002); Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in
Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805 (1998).
2. See Sridhar Pappu, John McCain in Manchester, Waiting for His Bus to
Come In, WASH. POST, July 29, 2007, at D1 ('You know the difference between a
lawyer and a catfish? ... One is a scum-sucking bottom-dweller and the other's
a fish."'). The joke received laughs at a gathering in Manchester. Id.
3. See, e.g., Virginia Heffernan, Me Fierce? It's All Make-Believe, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2007, at ARi. The character of Patty Hewes, the main character in the
new lawyer series "Damages," is described as "an ice-eyed trial lawyer and
serpentine liar who disdains white-collar violence in favor of open sadism. She
never settles for $100 million, in other words, when she can put everyone
through hell for a nickel more." Id.
4. THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE (Warner Bros. Pictures 1997). Al Pacino is Lucifer,
while Keanu Reeves plays the gullible associate.
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lawyers that sour the public on lawyers. Instead, it is
something about their perception of what lawyers are like
or what they do that makes lawyers seem so fundamentally
unappealing.
Some might argue that this negative view of lawyers is
necessarily the product of the role lawyers play in society.
Lawyers are often advocates for unappealing or unsavory
clients; they may be perceived as sympathizing with those
clients and eager to do their bidding. As advocates for these
sometimes unattractive clients, lawyers have an obligation
to pursue the best outcomes for those clients, not
necessarily for society at large. Lawyers are accordingly
perceived as guns for hire, with no values other than the
values their client brings to the relationship. Moreover, in
adversarial processes, lawyers may take extreme or
inflexible positions on their clients' behalf in order to create
room to negotiate an ultimately acceptable intermediate
resolution. Those initial positions-in which lawyers
conceal information, avoid concessions and generally look
utterly lacking in compassion or concern for anyone except
their clients-may make lawyers seem hostile, aggressive
and bloodthirsty, more interested in vicious battle than
peaceful and prompt resolution. Last of all, this advocacy is
often well-paid work, creating the impression that lawyers
are simply mouthpieces, willing to take on any client
representation, no matter how despicable, as long as the
money is good. While lay people may find these
characteristics abhorrent, some would argue that they are
inherent in the role of the lawyer, and therefore that dislike
of lawyers is an inevitable consequence of the adversary
system.
Lawyers certainly engage in behaviors when they are
acting on behalf of clients that are unattractive or
unappealing. But to some extent we excuse those behaviors
precisely because they are engaged in on behalf of clients.
The lawyer is permitted to behave that way because he is
acting, not on his own behalf, but as the agent of another.
In particular, consider the lawyerly behavior of parsing
and narrowly-and often inaccurately-construing a statement
or question. In ordinary social interaction, most of us would
find someone who insists on interpreting what we say
literally, rather than making an attempt to understand
what we mean and respond appropriately, to be highly
annoying. Yet lawyers do this kind of thing all the time.
930 [Vol. 55
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In deposition preparation, for example, a lawyer will try
to "train" a witness to answer only the question that is
asked. The lawyer will discourage the witness from
expanding on that answer to be more responsive to what
the witness believes was the questioner's intended inquiry. 5
Asked, "Do you know the time?" the ideally prepared and
obedient deposition witness who is wearing a watch will
answer 'Yes," answering only the question asked rather
than the implicit but unvoiced question inherent in it.
By contrast, in ordinary social interaction, a person
asked a question that is ambiguous or reflects a
fundamental misunderstanding of circumstances will
ordinarily respond in a way that attempts to determine the
question the asker intended to ask, and to answer it. Asked
by a stranger on the street, "Do you know the time?" a
person who merely answered 'Yes," standing alone, would
be viewed as rude and hostile. The failure to respond to the
implicit but unasked question marks the speaker as
unpleasant and uncooperative; most would assume that he
understood the asker's implicit desire to know what time it
was, and was choosing not to respond to it. Moreover, most
would assume that in doing so, he intended to send a
critical and derisive message about the lack of specificity in
the question, even though the question, while literally
inviting a yes-or-no answer, is routinely understood as a
request for the time of day.
In most ordinary social interaction, people helpfully
respond not just to the literal question asked, but to the
implicit question inherent in the spoken words. This is why
it can be so difficult to prepare a witness to follow the
unnatural and ritualistic rules of deposition behavior: they
are inconsistent with his natural, social instinct to be
responsive to a question from another person, and to
provide full information when a question indicates a less
5. See, e.g., THOMAS A. MAUET, PRETRIAL 268 (4th ed. 1999) (a lawyer should
advise a deponent, "Don't volunteer information. Answer only what the question
specifically calls for. Don't exaggerate or speculate. Give the best short,
accurate, truthful answer possible"); see also PAUL MICHAEL LISNEK & MICHAEL
J. KAUFMAN, DEPOSITIONS: PROCEDURE, STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUE § 8.8, at 8-4 to
-5 (1990) (a lawyer should instruct the witness on the "key rules of the
interaction," which include, "[a]nswer only the question asked; do not volunteer
any additional information beyond the scope of the question, and do not expand
on any previously answered question or seek to educate the examiner").
20071 931
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than full understanding of a situation with which he is
familiar.6
This particular category of lawyerly behavior-the
literalistic reading of language, the precise parsing of
questions and statements-is utterly different from the way
most people understand and respond to each other in social
interaction. Why, then, do we permit it at all? Why might
the fact that the lawyer is an agent for a client excuse this
otherwise annoying and socially unacceptable behavior?
Perhaps because the long-term interests of that "other,"
whose wishes, properly counseled, are the lawyer's sole
agenda, are best served through that behavior. Rigid and
narrow interpretations of language in depositions,
interrogatories, and testimony may be helpful to a client.
Insisting, for example, that a witness in a deposition
answer only the precise question asked-regardless of
whether he understood the questioner in fact to be asking
for something very different-may avoid a damaging
disclosure.
Imagine, for example, the friendly witness who has
offered an alibi statement on behalf of a criminal defendant,
claiming to have seen the defendant at the time of the crime
at a location distant from the crime scene. If the witness is
asked by the prosecutor, "Were you wearing your glasses
when you saw the defendant?" most lawyers would advise
her that if she was wearing glasses that belonged to her-
any glasses-that she could respond, 'Yes," even if the
glasses she was wearing were her sunglasses or her reading
glasses rather than prescribed glasses that corrected her
distance vision. The lawyer might even discourage the
witness's natural temptation to offer a more expansive and
complete answer to the question, urging her simply to
answer the question that was asked as briefly and
succinctly as possible.
This has its costs for the truth-seeking function: the
6. See LISNEK & KAUFMAN, supra note 5, § 8.4, at 8-2 ("Most deponents,
however, do not understand many of the rules because they lack a frame of
reference within which the rules operate. This often explains why witnesses
violate the instruction not to volunteer information, and subsequently proceed
to give extensive responses beyond the limited requirement of a close-ended
question. It is not that the deponent failed to read the rule; it is simply that
human nature fails to incorporate the adversarial nature of the interaction as
an expectation.").
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witness's answer, while technically truthful, is misleading.
Asking a witness whether she was wearing her glasses at
the time she observed an event is obviously intended to be
an inquiry into the witness's capacity to observe the event
accurately. The affirmative response to the question tends
to suggest an affirmative answer to the inquiry about
capacity, which leaves an inaccurate impression. To permit
that answer without elaboration is to leave the fact-finder
with incorrect information.
The perhaps troubling answer to that problem, in the
context of litigation, is to consider this a failing, not of the
witness or of the lawyer offering the testimony, but of the
lawyer eliciting the problematic answer. Litigation rules,
for the most part, make proper questioning and adequate
follow-up the responsibility of the adversary. Part of the
reason the testimony of the witness in the situation
discussed above created a false impression was that the
questioner failed to ask the right question. The question,
"Were you wearing your glasses?", is inherently ambiguous.
It asks whether the witness was wearing glasses, but fails
to recognize the possibility that she had several pairs and to
clarify which of those pairs she was wearing at the time. A
proper cross-examiner would pursue the matter further,
eliminating any ambiguity in the question and therefore the
answer. This would not prevent outright lying, of course,
but it would forestall a witness-and a lawyer-who was
resistant to disclosing the whole truth, but committed to
offering testimony that was technically truthful and
responsive to the precise questions asked. If the cross-
examiner does not follow up, the fault, in our somewhat
convoluted legal system, lies with him, rather than with the
lawyer who allowed his witness to offer technically truthful
but misleading testimony. 7
7. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 17 (1980) ("It remains as true
as ever that if a lawyer fails to ask the right question, the adversary will
cheerfully refrain from disclosing what might be vital or decisive information.").
This is not to suggest that the lawyer is required to guide the witness into
technically true, but misleading, testimony. There might be a strategic reason
to counsel the witness to give a fuller account. In the eyeglass hypothetical, a
lawyer might properly think that the misleading answer will be caught on
cross-examination and will have the effect of making the factfinder think the
witness (or the lawyer) is not worthy of trust. Under these circumstances, the
lawyer may decide it is better to clarify the misunderstandings rather than
2007] 933
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Even this is troubling, because the lawyer offering the
testimony knows that the answer is misleading. The lawyer
understands what the questioner meant to ask, and knows
that the questioner has not done a very good job of making
that meaning clear. In the context of the adversary system,
we could require the lawyer to behave differently, and
counsel the witness to answer the question he thinks the
questioner meant to ask, rather than the question he
actually asked; we could insist that lawyers look to the
spirit, rather than the letter, of the inquiry. But for the
most part, we do not.
We can imagine several reasons for this. One is that it
may sometimes be difficult for the lawyer to discern what
the questioner meant to ask. We do not usually make legal
rules that turn on one party's subjective understanding of
another party's intended meaning. Even if the lawyer
understood what the questioner wanted to elicit, it will be
hard to prove that he did, so it is difficult to see how a
requirement that a lawyer honor the spirit rather than the
letter of a question could be enforced. Moreover, there is
always a risk that encouraging lawyers to advise their
clients to answer the question they think was asked, rather
than the question that was actually asked, will militate in
the direction of increased obfuscation and concealment
rather than the reverse. Requiring the client to answer the
question that was asked gives the other side's advocate at
least some control over the responses he gets.
Last of all, we often make clients responsible for the
acts of their lawyers, whom they have chosen as their
agents. To the extent a misleading answer to an ambiguous
question injures the party whose lawyer failed to ask a
more precise one, we may view that as the consequence of
choosing the wrong lawyer in the first place. This is
particularly ironic if we are talking about a party who did
not have the authority to choose his own lawyer,8 but is a
leave them in the record. While the lawyer is not required to leave the
misleading response on the record, she is probably free to do so.
8. We can imagine many situations in which a client has not effectively
chosen his lawyer: court appointments, pro bono counsel, or simply the
vicissitudes of the economy, which may cause clients to choose lawyers not
because they like them, but because they can afford them. These problems
pervade the "agency" notion, but do not prevent its application to ascribe the
acts of the lawyer to the client.
934 [Vol. 5 5
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generally recognized principle.
We accordingly permit lawyers, in the service of their
clients, to interpret language literally and technically, even
if, in doing so, they offer statements or counsel testimony
that is ultimately misleading. I call this the "advocacy
privilege." It is not technically a "privilege," of course; it is a
convention in which we recognize a particular variety of
lawyerly behavior as acceptable in the context of client
representation that would not be viewed as appropriate in
ordinary social interactions. Even in that context, it is not
universally accepted; one could certainly argue that lawyers
should not engage in this behavior even in the context of
client representation. But it is not currently prohibited by
the rules of professional responsibility.
The advocacy privilege assumes certain rules of language-
based interactions that are somewhat inconsistent with the
rules that govern ordinary social interaction. One is that
anything that has not been explicitly said has not been said.
The second is that what has been said should be understood
literally, exactly in the manner in which it has been said.
We permit the privilege because it is used to advance
the interests of a client. 9 That suggests that a lawyer who is
acting on his own behalf, rather than on behalf of a client,
is not entitled to rely on the privilege.
There has been a considerable amount of commentary
about whether the guidance a lawyer should provide to a
client depends on the context in which an issue arises. For
example, some have argued that there is a difference
between advising clients about the legality of conduct ex
ante and advising them about how to defend conduct in
which the client has already engaged. But there has been
little conversation about how lawyers should behave when
they are advancing their own interests rather than those of
a client. 10
9. This is, of course, an oversimplification when we take into account lawyer
compensation. A lawyer who uses aggressive tactics to win a large settlement in
a contingent fee matter advances his own interests along with those of his
client; a lawyer using hourly billing could view a highly labor-intensive delaying
tactic as beneficial to himself as well as his client. For the purposes of this
Essay, I focus on the fact that the conduct directly advances the interests of the
client and only indirectly advances the lawyer's self-interest.
10. I leave aside here the situation in which a lawyer formally represents
2007] 935
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One of the reasons people hate lawyers is that lawyers
take advantage of the advocacy privilege when they are not
representing clients, but are simply advancing their own
interests. Since there is no client and no advocacy, there
should be no privilege. We have seen many recent examples
of lawyers who, in the service of their own interests, engage
in hyper-technical, legalistic manipulations of language.
This behavior-lawyers who parse language in dishonest,
misleading, and manipulative ways to benefit themselves,
rather than a client-makes all lawyers look bad.
This behavior may generate dislike and distrust of
lawyers partly because we see a lot of it. In recent years, we
have had several high-profile examples of lawyers using the
advocacy privilege solely to advance their own personal
interests.
Consider, for example, Bill Clinton's grand jury
testimony. During the Paula Jones sexual harassment case,
Clinton's lawyer, Robert Bennett, characterized an affidavit
that Monica Lewinsky had submitted in the litigation as
"saying that there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any
manner, shape or form, with President Clinton.""
Subsequently, Clinton was questioned under oath about
what Bennett had said on his behalf in court about his
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 12 Clinton was asked
whether the statement that "there is absolutely no sex of
any kind in any manner, shape or form, with President
Clinton was an utterly false statement."'13  Clinton
responded:
"It depends upon what the meaning of the word 'is' is. If the-if
he-if 'is' means is and never has been, that is not-that is one
thing. If it means there is none, that was a completely true
statement .... Now, if someone had asked me on that day, are you
having any kind of sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky, that is,
asked me a question in the present tense, I would have said no.
himself, though we all know what kind of a client he has under those
circumstances.
11. THE STARR REPORT 46-47 (Prima Pub'g 1998).
12. See Transcript of Record at 509, Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118
(E.D. Ark. 1999), available at http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/7/255/2422/
16apr20041404/icreport.access.gpo.gov/hdl O5-31 1/vol3/tab 16.pdf [hereinafter
Clinton's Grand Jury Testimony].
13. Id.
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And it would have been completely true."14
Clinton's response was widely ridiculed, but it makes
perfect sense from the perspective of the advocacy privilege.
If the question had been clear-if the question had been "Is
Ms. Lewinsky currently engaging in sexual activity of any
kind with the President?", the appropriate and non-
misleading answer would have been no, if at the time the
question was asked no such activity was ongoing. If the
question meant to inquire into whether there had ever been
any sexual relationship between the President and Ms.
Lewinsky, the question was poorly framed; it could fairly be
interpreted to ask a present-tense question when the asker
actually sought information about past as well as present
time frames.
In effect, what Clinton was saying was that, as an
application of the advocacy privilege, it would be
appropriate to parse the word "is," and treat it as a present-
tense inquiry only into current activities. Having construed
that question narrowly, the advocacy privilege would
permit a client to answer that limited question accurately.
Whether the lawyer would actually advise the client to
answer that way would be a strategic decision, but the
option to take the technical approach suggested by Clinton
would be available. The fault, in the advocacy context,
would lie with the questioner, who should have asked better
questions, properly inquiring into distinct time frames. If
such questions had been asked, the opportunity to use the
ambiguity of the question to offer an arguably truthful
response would not have been available.
In representing a client at a deposition, many lawyers
might advise the client to respond in the way that Clinton
suggested would have been truthful. If the question asks
the witness whether he is now engaged in a sexual relationship,
and he is not now engaged in a sexual relationship, he
should answer no. If there has been a prior sexual
relationship, it is not a witness's duty to volunteer that
14. Timothy Noah, Bill Clinton and the Meaning of "Is," SLATE, Sept. 13,
1998, http://www.slate.com/i/1000162/ (quoting THE STARR REPORT, supra note
11, at 212 n.1128). The questioner went on: "Was Mr. Bennett [Clinton's
counsel] aware of this tense-based distinction you were making?" Clinton's
Grand Jury Testimony, supra note 12, at 511. That question went unanswered
in colloquy. Id.
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information. Instead, it is incumbent on the questioner to
ask the right question. As an advocacy problem, this would
be addressed as a failure of the questioner rather than an
impropriety on the part of the lawyer for the witness. 15
But Clinton was not acting as an advocate at the time
he was parsing the questions. Instead, with regard to a
question he was asked in his personal capacity-not as the
representative of a client-he took an advocate's position.
In that, he was benefited by his training as a lawyer; he
was educated in how to understand and interpret the
questions he was asked in a way that an ordinary person
would not. But his resort to the nit-picking, language-
parsing, obviously misleading advocacy privilege led to wide
disapproval. Interestingly enough, he had a very precise
sense of when his approach was legitimate and when it
would cross the line. Asked whether his understanding of
the tense issue meant that unless he was actually engaging
in sexual activity during the deposition, he would have
answered no to a question about whether he was engaging
in such activity with Ms. Lewinsky, 16 he disavowed any
intention to answer that way,1 7 suggesting that such an
15. Defenders of President Clinton took precisely this tack. See, e.g., Richard
Lacayo, When Is Sex Not "Sexual Relations"?, TIME, Aug. 24, 1998, at 38,
available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/O8/17/time/clinton.html
(concluding that at Clinton's deposition in the Paula Jones case, because of the
precise legal definition of "sexual relations" that was accepted by the parties,
Clinton's denial that he had had sexual relations with Lewinsky was
"technically 'true' . . . even if she happened to perform fellatio on him."
Concluded the commentator, "Isn't the law a wonderfully intricate device?" The
commentator's conclusion was that Clinton's "word-wiggle" amounted to
"[h]iding behind the ultimate tortuous legalism," which would not "pass the
laugh test with the American people").
16. Clinton's Grand Jury Testimony, supra note 12, at 512 ("I just want to
make sure I understand, Mr. President. Do you mean today that because you
were not engaging in sexual activity with Ms. Lewinsky during the deposition
that the statement of Mr. Bennett [was true]?').
17. Id. ("No, sir. I mean that at the time of the deposition ... that was well-
beyond any point of improper contact between me and Ms. Lewinsky. So that
anyone generally speaking in the present tense saying that was not an
improper relationship would be telling the truth if that person said there was
not, in the present tense-the present tense encompassing many months. That's
what I meant by that .... I was obviously not involved in anything improper
during the deposition. I was trying to tell you that, generally speaking in the
present tense, if someone said that, that would be true.").
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approach would be unacceptably "cute."'8
That this behavior was intentional is evident from the
following highly peculiar transcript of Clinton's statements
on a television interview show. There, he struggled to
answer the questions he was asked truthfully by
controlling-in a distinctly awkward and non-colloquial
fashion-the verb tense with which he answered the
questions:
Question: The news of this day is that Kenneth Starr, the
independent counsel, is investigating allegations that you
suborned perjury by encouraging a 24-year-old woman, a former
White House intern, to lie under oath in a civil deposition about
her having had an affair with you.
Mr. President, is that true?
Clinton: That is not true. That is not true. I did not ask anyone to
tell anything other than the truth. There is no improper
relationship. And I intend to cooperate with this inquiry. But that
is not true.
Question: You had no sexual relationship with this young woman?
Clinton: There is not a sexual relationship. That is accurate ....
Now, I don't know what else to tell you . . .I didn't ask anybody
not to tell the truth. There is no improper relationship. 1
9
Why does this make people angry? Remember that the
advocacy privilege distorts the truth. We permit it because
there are constraints on our ability to enforce the opposite
rule, and because there is an advocate on the other side who
has the capacity to restrict the application of the privilege,
making the ambiguous concrete by asking better questions.
A lawyer's decision-whether strategic or inadvertent-to
leave language vague has consequences that the lawyer's
18. Id.
19. Interview by Jim Lehrer with William J. Clinton, President of the
United States (Jan. 21, 1998), available at http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/
1998/01/21/transcriptsllehrer/. One article discussing this interview referred to
"the oblique language and peculiar verb tense he used to explain himself."
President Clinton: 'There Is No Improper Relationship,' HUMAN EVENTS, Jan. 30,
1998, at 4.
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client will have to live with. In the context of a lawyer using
the advocacy privilege not to protect a client's interest but
simply to protect himself, there is no justification for the
distorting power of the privilege.
There is no ideological monopoly on the use of the
advocacy privilege. Consider Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales. In the run-up to the reauthorization of the USA
PATRIOT Act, Gonzales was asked whether he was aware
of any civil rights violations arising from the use of the
Patriot Act. "There has not been one verified case of civil
liberties abuse," Gonzales assured senators.20 In the three
months before Gonzales made this statement, he had
received at least half a dozen reports of legal or procedural
violations from the FBI.21 In a subsequent inquiry into
whether Gonzales's statement to the senators had been
truthful, his spokesman said that he was speaking 'in the
context' of reports by the department's inspector general...
that found no misconduct or specific civil liberties abuses
related to the Patriot Act."22 Gonzales's defense of his own
conduct, accordingly, relied on the advocacy privilege. His
claim, in effect, was that his answer was accurate if the
question he had been asked could have been understood to
mean, "Have there been any reports from the department's
inspector general that found misconduct or specific civil
liberties abuses related to the Patriot Act?" If the question
could literally be understood that way, his answer to it was
truthful. His spokesman's statement does not address
whether he understood the question to be asking for
something else and whether he recognized that his answer
was misleading.
Another controversy involving Gonzales was whether
his statement that there had been no disagreements within
the Administration about the legitimacy of its warrantless
wiretapping program was truthful. Since another witness
had testified that disagreements among members of the
Justice Department had led to a dramatic late-night
hospital visit to the bedside of the then-Attorney General
John Ashcroft, significant questions arose about the
20. John Solomon, Gonzales Was Told of FBI Violations, WASH. POST, July
10, 2007, at Al.
21. See id.
22. Id.
940 [Vol. 55
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accuracy of the Attorney General's statement. Gonzales's
subsequent explanation was that the disagreements in
question did not relate to the "Terrorist Surveillance
Program that the President announced to the American
people," but to some other undisclosed data mining
activities. 23 This implied an undisclosed but narrow
interpretation of the language he used-the "Terrorist
Surveillance Program"-to exclude related but not identical
activities. 24 As one commentator described this behavior:
"Gonzales once again dissembled and misled. He was too
clever by seven-eighths. He employed his signature brand of
inartful dodging-linguistic evasion, poorly executed. '25
These resorts to the advocacy privilege related not to
Gonzales's representation of his client, but to whether he
himself had been truthful in the statements he made, and
therefore are properly viewed as protecting not his client's
interests, but his own.
The problem is not confined to lawyers in politics.
Though the opportunity to see a non-politician lawyer use
the advocacy privilege in the public light is rare, consider
Andrew Speaker. Speaker is the man who flew to Europe
and then back to Canada from Europe with what appeared
at the time to be extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis.
Told that he was not highly contagious but nonetheless
should not travel, Speaker traveled anyway. His
explanation for this behavior was that he had not been
ordered not to travel; he had been told that the officials in
his county Health Department "would prefer that he did not
23. Ruth Marcus, Short of Perjury, WASH. POST, July 31, 2007, at A19.
Senator Patrick Leahy's comment was that "The Attorney General's legalistic
explanation of his misleading testimony under oath before the Senate Judiciary
Committee last week is not what one should expect from the top law
enforcement officer of the United States. It is time for full candor to enforce the
law and promote justice, rather than word parsing." Comment of Sen. Patrick
Leahy on the Attorney General's Letter Regarding July 24, 2007 Testimony
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (Aug. 1, 2007),
http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200708/080107b.html.
24. See Eugene Robinson, Bedtime for Gonzo, WASH. POST, July 12, 2007, at
A21 ("The most generous interpretation is that Gonzo, fearful of facing a
perjury rap, is insisting on an artificially and dishonestly narrow definition of
'the terrorist surveillance program that the president announced'-leaving out
'intelligence activities' that any reasonable person ... would consider part of the
program. The nice word for that would be dissembling.").
25. Marcus, supra note 23, at A19.
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fly," but understood that to mean that there was no
outright prohibition on his doing so.26 That turned out to be
accurate-the officials did not want him to fly, but did not
have the authority to prevent him from doing so unless they
believed that he would ignore their advice.2 7 Subsequently,
when he returned from Europe, he was told not to travel,
but he did so anyway, because "there were no legal orders
in place preventing his travel, and no laws were broken. '28
The responses of these three individuals-all lawyers-
could fairly be characterized as "legalistic."29
Dictionary.com defines "legalism" as "strict adherence, or
the principle of strict adherence, to law or prescription, esp.
to the letter rather than the spirit."30 The term "legalistic"
has unquestionably taken on a negative cast; something
that is legalistic is nit-picky, technically accurate but
misleading, or true in name only. Calling the responses of
these lawyers "legalistic" is not praise for their strategic
deftness; it means that their behavior is troubling, adhering
only to the "letter" rather than the "spirit" of the law.
26. TB Carrier Says He Never Meant Harm, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 2-3,
2007. Speaker said "he was not flatly forbidden to travel. The dispute appeared
to be based on his interpretation of language used by cautious public health
officials. Speaker said that he was told he was not contagious or a danger to
anyone, but that officials would prefer that he did not fly." Id.
27. According to CDC Director Julie Gerberding, "[s]tate law didn't allow
officials to prohibit Speaker from flying. In fact, she said, Speaker would have
had to first show that he was going to ignore the advice not to travel before the
state would be empowered to do anything." TB Patient Insists He Was Never
Banned from Travel, CNN.coM, June 7, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/
POLITICS/06/07/tb.borders/index.html?iref=newssearch. "Yes, I was told that
Fulton County would prefer that I not travel .... Id.
28. Id.
29. At least with regard to Clinton and Gonzales, they have been. On
Clinton, see, for example, James Bennet & Alison Mitchell, President Sends
Aides to Soothe Angry Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at Al (the
question is "whether the President lied and whether he is now trying to dodge
behind a wall of legalistic language"). See also id. at A23 (President's
spokesman "insisted that Mr. Clinton was not resorting to a legalistic defense").
On Gonzales, see, for example, Scott Shane & David Johnston, Mining of Data
Prompted Fight Over U.S. Spying, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2007, at Al ("If the
dispute chiefly involved data mining, rather than eavesdropping, Mr.
Gonzales'[s] defenders may maintain that his narrowly crafted answers, while
legalistic, were technically correct.").
30. Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Legalism (last
visited Sept. 30, 2007).
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Each of these situations involved the parsing of
language. The lawyers, asked questions or presented with
situations in which they had to interpret language to govern
their choice of subsequent conduct, chose interpretations
which, while technically plausible, purposefully misunderstood
the questions they had been asked or the directions they
had been given. In that regard, each individual relied on
the "advocacy privilege"-the right to engage in legalistic
parsing of language when advancing a client's interest-to
protect himself, to shield his wrongful conduct, or to conceal
information he preferred not to disclose.
Why does this create resentment towards lawyers? One
might argue that lawyers are simply benefited by their
professional training, in the same way that used car
salesmen probably get good deals on used cars and bankers
know how to negotiate for the best mortgages. Why isn't
reliance on the advocacy privilege simply one of those
professional benefits of being a trained lawyer?
One reason is that people expect lawyers acting on their
own behalf to observe the most basic rules of social
interaction. Let's take as our starting point how the
reasonable person who is not a lawyer would have
understood the communication. When we conclude that a
lawyer has treated a communication or analyzed a situation
"legalistically," we are saying that the lawyer has not
understood the communication or situation the same way a
person would have who was not a lawyer.
Imagine that a health department official tells a person
who is not a lawyer, "Gee, you have a strain of tuberculosis
that is resistant to drug therapy. We don't know yet quite
how serious this is, but until we find out, we would prefer
that you not travel." How does the person who is not a
lawyer understand this statement? The average person,
perhaps, views this as the health official being directive but
polite. When he says, "we would prefer that you not travel,"
he means, "we don't want you to travel," and most people,
told by authorities that the authorities don't want them to
do something, don't do it.31
31. This is, of course, the problem with criminal procedure doctrine that
views "requests" by police as creating "consensual encounters" with individuals,
and only direct orders by police as creating "seizures" under the Fourth
Amendment. Relying on the linguistic characteristic of the communication in
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The lawyer, on the other hand, listens to what the
official does not say. When the official says, "We would
prefer that you not travel," the lawyer interprets the failure
to use directive language as affirmative permission to
engage in precisely the behavior the official seeks to
dissuade. In lawyer-speak, "We would prefer that you not
travel" means something very different from what it means
to a lay person; it in fact means: "While we would like it if
you didn't travel, we cannot require you not to and you are
free to travel if you wish to." The conversation with the
health official, which gives pause to the average lay person,
actually gives comfort to the lawyer, who may even tape the
conversation to prove that he was never explicitly directed
not to travel.32
Or imagine a lay person being asked, in a solemn
environment where he was under oath, "Is there a sexual
relationship between you and Ms. Jones?" (There was, but
there isn't any longer). My guess is that at least some lay
people might either answer "yes," or elaborate, providing
further detail that seems responsive: "Well, there was, till
last week. But we've broken up. So I guess there used to be
but there isn't now." The lawyer, thinking himself shielded
by the advocacy privilege, does neither, instead giving a
literally correct but materially misleading response.
Lawyers relying on the advocacy privilege claim the
lawyer role instead of applying the ordinary norms of
human interaction. While ordinary people interpret
language in a cooperative way, trying to understand how
the speaker intended to use language and to be responsive
to the spirit of the inquiry, the lawyer relying on the
advocacy privilege acts selfishly, rejecting the reciprocal
social obligation of communication and comprehension in
favor of a unilateral insistence on proper questioning by his
adversary.
There is another group that routinely behaves this way:
deciding on its constitutional significance fails to recognize the fact that many
individuals view the request of a police officer as indistinguishable from a direct
order. See Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to
Comply: Challenging the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF.
L. REV. 1483, 1492-98 (2007).
32. Mr. Speaker said that the conversation was, in fact, tape-recorded. See
Bill Sanderson, Groom's TB 'Bug" Recording Shows Feds OK'd Flight, He Says,
N.Y. POST, June 2, 2007, at 4.
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children. Anyone who has raised children knows that they
are natural litigators. One manifestation of this behavior is
the literal interpretation of language used by authority
figures. A direction to "put the dishes away" may be greeted
by a smug literalism: the dishes are put away, but they are
not dried first. When the parent confronts the child with
"These dishes are wet!" the child may respond, "You only
told me to put the dishes away; you didn't tell me to dry
them."
In this interaction, the child knew what the speaker
meant. The child intentionally used literalism to
misinterpret the direction of the authority figure; the child
did this to confound and manipulate the authority figure.
The result is an inherently selfish use of language; the child
uses intentional misunderstanding to avoid responsibility
and consequences.
Interestingly enough, in this context, the technique
does not work. The authority figure's response to such an
interaction is not to concede defeat in the battle of
literalism. Instead, it is to reprimand the conduct as
inherently childish and selfish, and to insist that the child
adhere to the norms of mutually understood communication.
"Now, come on, you knew what I meant. We don't put
dishes away without drying them first."
The lawyer who insists on the advocacy privilege relies
on a set of behaviors that are inherently selfish,
uncooperative, and inconsistent with social norms. 33 The
public is probably dubious enough about the advocacy
privilege in the context of client representation. In the
context of lawyers simply advancing their own interests, it
just seems like a complex way to engage in untruthful and
manipulative behavior.
Another reason to be concerned about the advocacy
privilege is that it ordinarily makes sense to allow it to be
invoked only where the adversary also has an advocate who
understands that it is his responsibility to counter the
privilege with careful and precise use of language. As we
have seen, in a litigation context, a narrow and
33. See Bennet & Mitchell, supra note 29, at Al (quoting Rep. Robert
Menendez: "In terms of the public discussion [about Pres. Clinton's statements],
the average American does not understand the legalisms and doesn't view them
as being forthright.").
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manipulative interpretation of a question can be followed
by a more precise and more carefully worded question; the
same is true in the case of drafting or negotiating, where
one side's use of language can be challenged, contested, and
limited by the actions of a lawyer on the other side.
Where a lawyer deals for him or herself, however, it is
not always clear to the other side that there is "lawyering"
going on. There may be no advocate for the adversary, and
nothing may put the adversary on notice that the
interaction is one in which the privilege is likely to apply.
The only constraint on the advocacy privilege, the only limit
that rationalizes its existence at all, is the assumed
presence and vigorous efforts of an advocate for the other
side. Where the lawyer is acting in her own self-interest,
that element may be missing altogether.
Should we prevent lawyers from relying on the
advocacy privilege when they are simply advancing their
own interests? We probably can't. For one thing, it is
possible that they can't help it. Trained to parse language
legalistically in the interests of their clients, they may be
incapable of doing something different in their own lives.
Moreover, it seems somewhat counterintuitive to require
lawyers to adhere to a more stringent code of behavior
when they are advancing their own interests than when
they are advancing the interests of their clients.
Nonetheless, as a profession we have to be concerned
that lawyers who rely on the advocacy privilege to advance
their own interests diminish the reputation of the
profession and fuel the resentment and hostility that many
feel towards the profession. The question may not be
whether lawyers may resort to the advocacy privilege in
advancing their own interests, but whether they should.
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